posted 03-04-2001 10:50 PM               

First off, how much food would be needed per soldier, per day? In the 1970's the US Army Quartermaster Corps calculated that a soldier in combat needs 3600 calories per day. This would be a minimum and more would be better. In the past it was not uncommon for people engaged in hard, sustained physical labor to consume 4-5000 calories per day. The standard ration of both the Macedonian and Roman soldier was 3 lbs (1.36 kgs) of grain per day. Milled and baked into bread this would only provide 3100 usable calories. Obviously, this was only his basic ration. It could keep him going for some time, but other foodstuffs would be required whenever possible or his condition would begin to deteriorate. Four pounds (1.82 kgs) would be needed to provide 3600 usable calories. The English soldier around the reign of Edward I was provided 4 lbs of wheat plus other foodstuffs that would provide him over 5000 calories. Plus a gallon (3.77 l) of ale or beer; after all, water was unsafe to drink. The medieval soldier normally had to buy his rations (he was well paid for his day), but if a king wanted to keep his army together he had to ensure food was there for them to buy.

BTW, meat is an exellent source of food. It provides more usable calories than an equal weight of grain, it's easier to prepare and can transport itself until needed. Most armies in the past drove food animals along with them.

Now this food has to be transported. A packhorse or mule can carry 200 lbs (91 kgs). While the figures I have aren't firm for a wagon during the Middle Ages, an estimate of 1500-2000 lbs (682-909 kgs) for a wagon pulled by 4 animals is probably safe unless the roads are truly bad. But these animals and their driver have to be fed in turn. Grain should be supplied whenever possible to maintain the condition of the animals, a very important consideration. Unlike a soldier, once a horse, mule or ox breaks down it's forever after rendered useless for military service. Given rest and proper food, soldiers can recover from a sustained period of starvation rations; an army's animals can't. A horse or mule should be provided 5-10 lbs (2.27-4.55 kgs) of grain per day PLUS 10-13 lbs (4.55-5.91 kgs) of hay or 25 lbs (11.36 kgs) of grass. The higher grain figure should be provided to cavalry mounts. A draught ox requires 6 lbs (2.73 kgs) of grain and 14 lbs (6.36 kgs) hay or 30 lbs (13.64 kgs) of grass.

If grass alone is provided as feed, a horse or mule requires 50 lbs (22.73 kgs) and an ox even more. A minimum of 5 hrs per day must be allowed for the animals to graze; less time would be required if the grass is cut and brought to them. Either way, an acre (.4 hectare) could provide grass for about 20 animals. An army with 10,000 animals would require almost one square mile (2.5 sq kms) of new grass every day to feed them. Having them spread out grazing is an invitation to an enemy cavalry column to swoop down to kill or drive off hard to replace animals, plus kill the herders and herd guards. Even if only a few lives are lost, if such losses are presistent morale will suffer. Cutting grass and hauling it to the animals is a more efficient and safer way to feed them. But that requires about 2000 men and several hours for 10,000 animals. Yet the animals must be fed, just as the soldiers must be. In reality, a combination of grazing and cutting would be used.

I'm afraid I have no idea how long these animals can go on short rations or be subjected to overwork before they would break down. Because of the requirements of the animals far more than those of the soldiers, it's impractical to haul food and fodder by land more than 5-10 days from a depot or to carry more than a 10 day supply with an army. But hauling food from a depot is expensive if land transportation is involved. It's estimated that before modern roads the cost of food doubled if it had to be transported by land as little as 60 miles (96 kms).

That leaves two ways to feed an army for a sustained period--transport supplies by water or move the army to a source of supplies. Even a small boat can carry as much as a wagon and the boatmen would eat far less by weight than the wagon's animals. A small ship can carry as much as 100 wagons. Moving the army to a source of supplies means marching to where it can buy food (in friendly territory) or seize it (if enemy territory). Marching into enemy territory has been a prefered strategy for thousands of years. You don't have to pay for the food the army takes, you don't care if the locals face starvation afterwards (that can even be an objective of your campaign) and you're taking vital resources away from the enemy. This strategy has been called "making war feed itself." Feeding your army while hurting the enemy were both goals of a medieval chevauchee. As an added bonus, if you hurt the enemy enough in this manner he might sue for peace or be brought to battle if he has so far been avoiding it and you've been seeking it.

All this can be summed up by saying that unless food and fodder could be brought in by water, basically armies had to move or starve.

For thousands of years the average, sustainable rate of march for an army was 10-12 miles (16-19 kms) per day and it was often less. Exceptional armies or ones with favorable circumstances might make 15-20 miles (24-32 kms) for a time. While marching along the coast of Asia Minor (with ships transporting his supplies), Alexander average 15 miles per day with one day a week of rest. His best day's march was 19.5 miles. The day of rest would also have been spent grinding grain and baking it into bread for issuing throughout the following week. Meanwhile, the animals would spend the entire day grazing (making up for shortfalls in the preceding week) while parties cut grass to take along to feed to them during the following days.

As an army marched, foraging parties would spread out locating food and fodder, eating part there, bringing part back to the army and destroying the rest in enemy territory. This is a good part of the reason so many contemporary illustrations of medieval warfare depict looting in progress--the soldiers are trying to feed themselves and their animals (plus pick up any valuables they can find). There is an added bonus in that these foraging parties can provide part of a screen around the main body. More than once during his march through Georgia, Sherman's bummers were the first to encounter militia or confederate forces arrayed to oppose him. We can be sure that happened countless times further back in history.

There were drawbacks to these foraging parties, however. They were vulnerable to attack, a risk that had to be taken. If the enemy pressed too closely and foraging parties could not be sent out, the army began to go hungry. Desertion was much easier from a foraging party than from the main body. And unless it was known that a battle was likely imminent so that they could be recalled or kept in camp, part of the army would be missing when it was needed.

To briefly sum up the foregoing, when an army marched through a land of plenty, it ate well. When it marched through a land of few food resources it depended upon the supplies in its wagons until it could get to a richer region. And if it couldn't get there in about a week's time, it began to go hungry.

Another way of supplying an army needs to be considered--the establishment of magazines. Before he started for the heartland of the Perissa Empire, Alexander sent ahead and had supplies gathered to be waiting for his army. A king planning a campaign would have royal agents gather supplies ahead of time near to where the campaign would be waged. Edward I had food gathered in the southwest English counties before his campaigns in Wales and in the north before the ones in Scotland. (He also relied on ships to bring food to his army when in enemy territory.) Cities and great castles could function as magazines to store food in advance of the army's arrival.

This is part of the reason the besieging of castles was so much a part of medieval warfare. They not only dominated the countryside, provided a place of refuge for the local population and had garrisons that could issue forth and attack the supply lines of an army that had bypassed them. They could also contain supplies to sustain friendly forces. A well-stocked castle can contain supplies to feed a large force for a considerable time. Whole grain, if kept dry and free of vermin, can last for years. Hay,if kept dry, can be used as fodder for up to 5 years, although after two it starts to deteriorate. Take an enemy's castle and you not only make it more difficult for him to operate in that area, but you might gain a bonus of food and fodder for your army.

There is one last way to feed an army--the use of sutlers, civilian contractors to do the job. This did relieve a major burden from a commander in that he didn't have to devote time in planning how to feed his army and send out endless messages for food to be gathered at such-and-such a place. The sutler (or sutlers) would be a merchant presumably with experience in moving large cargoes from place-to-place. On the other hand, he was working strictly for profit. He wouldn't have quite as much motivation to keep the army fed as its commander and the soldiers did.

The evidence is that every one of these methods or a combination of them has been used by all pre-industrial armies throughout time.

A quick mention should be made concerning water. A man needs a minimum of 2 quarts (1.89 l) per day. If he's engaged in hard physical activity (and soldiering is hard work) that should be doubled. A horse or mule requires a minimum of 8 gallons (30.2 l) per day. If worked hard in a hot climate it will require about double that. Armies marched along rivers as far as possible then cut across as quickly as possible to the next source of water. It was impossible for a pre-industrial army to carry enough water to sustain itself in a truly waterless desert for more than 3-4 days. After that, animals began to die, then people soon after.

posted 03-05-2001 05:59 AM               

You have already summed up the most important elements of ancient and medieval logistics. I'd like to add that most armies of the time were intentionally kept relatively small - not because their commanders couldn't aford more troops, but quite simply because they didn't have the resources and transport capabilities to supply them for a prolonged period of time.

Pillaging in enemy territory could work, but only as long as the army kept moving. A wise commander would bypass large castles and heavily fortified cities if at all possible, knowing that his army would soon deplete all the resources in the area. Sun Tzu emphasized that strongly.

posted 03-05-2001 12:48 PM               

Bypassing strong points was often used, but there was a risk in doing so. While there was not much of a food surplus in ancient or medieval times, there was some. This surplus would generally be found in a strong point, a city or castle. So if you bypassed them you left an enemy supply depot behind you with the potential to supply an enemy force operating along YOUR supply lines (if you didn't just rely upon plundering). A bonus to taking such a stronghold was the possibility of gaining supplies for your forces. Bypassing a stronghold or besieging it were both gambles. Each commander had to decide for himself which gamble was best under the circumstances.

Your example of the Avars has touched upon one of the main problems with a siege as far as the besiegers are concerned--getting food to your army. You soon stripped the nearby countryside bare and had to bring in supplies. As I pointed out in my original post this was virtually impossible without water transport and a well organized supply system. The Macedonians and the Romans had such a supply system, most medievel armies didn't. But medieval kings did do the best they could in this regard.

Gordon:

posted 03-05-2001 09:45 PM               

Roel--with all the canals in your country, Dutch forces had it fairly easy supplying themselves when in their own country. I'm glad you mentioned the "cogge" intended for the militia's use. I remember reading how at a later date, during the war for independence from Spain, you'd bring supplies to besieged cities aross the ice.

BTW, what can you tell us all about the Dutch arquebusers on skates that attacked the Spanish during winter? There's a unique military force! Should be worth a post in itself on this forum.

I've just made a quick check of Prestwich's description of the Weardale campaign. The English did catch up with the Scots (who let them do so), but the Scots were in too strong a position atop a steep hill. More than two weeks passed with the English getting hungerier and hungrier before they returned to England. I'd say logistics (more accurately the lack of proper logistics) played a key role in that campaign.

posted 03-06-2001 06:19 AM               

Yet on the other hand, supply lines were generally much less important in the Middle Ages than they are now. A typical medieval army could procure almost everything locally and could usually sustain itself for a long time if it kept moving.

posted 03-06-2001 07:55 PM               

Nice to meet somebody who knows the history of my country. You are referring to the siege of Haarlem (1571/72). During winter, supplies were brought in over the frozen 'Haarlemmermeer' (Lake Haarlem). As we know, history repeats itself, so in world war II, the Russians did exactly the same. Over the frozen Lake Ladoga, precious supplies were brought to besieged Leningrad.
Back to the siege of Haarlem. When the ice melted, armed Spanish barges prevented further supplying and in the end, the city surrendered. Although the citizens were not starving yet, the plague prevented them from further fighting.
As for the arquebusers on ice, skating has been for a long time a popular way of travelling in winter. Although there is very little evidence, it may have been used for moving small bands of troops during those days. However, firing a heavy arquebus when standing on skates seems impossible to me. I think they took off the skates before engaging. It could be usefull for hit-and-run actions by small parties. The only strong evidence for skating troops comes, surprisingly, from quite recently. During the mobilization of 1939/'40, the army issued skates to the infantry in the winter (in other seasons, the men were supposed to go by bike, since there were only few trucks available).
Sometimes the ice worked against us. For many centuries we have considered the Rhine and its branches to be a great natural defense to the French. However, in the winter of 1795, a very cold one, general Pichegru marched his army, including cavalry and artillery over the frozen Rhine, thus spelling the end of the old Republic of the United Provinces.

posted 03-06-2001 09:00 PM               

But scorched earth wasn't just used offensively. The Weardale campaign mentioned above failed in large part because the Scottish forces fell back from the border, destroying what food they could not carry with them. This left the English to advance over scorched earth where they could find nothing to eat. Edward II being an idiot, he did not embark on campaign with his logistics secure in advance.

Yes, a medieval army usually could keep itself fed when marching. I did mention this in my original post. But moving where? Unless you're just conducting a massive raid, an army's movements must have an objective in mind. Or are you just blundering about the countryside from one meal to the next? The enemy knows the strategic points even better than you do since it's his country and he has them guarded. He's also stripping the countryside of food as much as he can in advance of your arrival to feed his troops and to deny yours.

But moving your army doesn't always guarantee you can feed it. Henry V's army was moving AND starving on its way to Agincourt because the French were pressing him too closely to allow foraging. Armies lived off the countryside because they had to, not because they wanted to. You may be sure medieval commanders knew very well the risks of relying upon a foraging strategy to feed their armies.

posted 03-07-2001 06:31 AM               

The very nature of medieval states did not allow scorched earth policy to be enforced. It's something that is only possible now in times of national states and total wars. The first case of true scorched earth policy that I could think of took place during the Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The Russians were probably the first to systematically lay waste to their own land, thus forcing the French to become increasingly reliant on the already overstretched supply lines.

A good commander would bypass all unimportant strongpoints and only concentrate on those worth the risk. Many medieval campaigns did boil down to what you described as blundering about the countryside in search of a meal. It was usually a result of poor leadership and low morale.

posted 03-08-2001 02:40 PM               

Answering for Brock

quote:

---

Because of the requirements of the animals far more than those of the soldiers, it's impractical to haul food and fodder by land more than 5-10 days from a depot or to carry more than a 10 day supply with an army. But hauling food from a depot is expensive if land transportation is involved. It's estimated that before modern roads the cost of food doubled if it had to be transported by land as little as 60 miles (96 kms).

---

The Mongols raise some interesting points. Their transport moved quickly because they lived off the land, and had little or no logistic tail. However, the idea has been put forth that their transport system may have been one of the reasons they failed to move further west into Europe. Look at the numbers: about 70,000 Mongols in Hungary and Poland, each with 5 horses (at least) gives 350,000 horses. Based on Brock's original post, each horse needs maybe 15 lbs of feed and hay a day (that's allowing for small steppe ponies), gives 5,200,000 lbs of food a day. If grazing on grass alone, say 40 lbs/day = 14 million pounds of grass per day. Look at it the other way: 10,000 horses/sq. mile, with 350,000 horses, = 35 sq. miles of grazing a day.

That's a lot of grass.

It isn't that bad if you are in the Ukraine, but suppose the Mongols had converged on the next strong target in Central Europe: the Kingdom of Bohemia. Feeding that number of horses in what is now the Czech Republic would be a nightmare. Admittedly the Mongols would have spread out most of the time, but any attempt at concentration (i.e. a major siege or battle) would risk starving their horses, at least in a Medieval European context.

posted 03-08-2001 09:51 PM               

Chomint--I made much of water transportation because it's so much more efficient than land, therefore armies used it just as much as they could. Until the invention of the railroad, hauling high bulk, low value cargoes (like an army's food & fodder) was very expensive over any appreciable distance. Let's examine a hypothetical example. First, I'm going to be referencing some of the sources named in my original post by author's name.

Let's say you're a Roman offical in Gaul in the late First Century A.D. You've been ordered to see to the transport of enough grain for a 10 day supply for 6000 men distance of 100 miles. I'm going to be using liters, not pounds, here. A legionare's grain ration was 1.5 liters (just over 3 lbs) per day. 6000x1.5x10 = 90,000 liters. Now you have two ways to transport this grain. An excellent road (and the Romans did have excellent roads) runs the entire distance as does a river whose current averages 3 mph over the distance. At this time of the year there are 10 useful hours of daylight.

"The Ancient Mesopotamian City" by Marc van de Mieroop states that on the Euphrates there were boats capable of transporting 3600 liters of grain and crewed by 6 men. The exact time is not stated, but a mention is made of money which utilized the ancient Mesopotamian money system, not the later Perisan. I think it's safe to assume that similar boats could be found in Gaul of the late First Century. Thus, it would require 25 boats and 150 men to transport the grain by river. Ten hours per day at 3 mph = 30 miles per day. You must hire 150 men and 25 boats for 3 1/3 days to move the grain by river.

Now let's consider moving it by land, that is, by wagon. To keep things as equal as possible, let's say 6 wagons each pulled by 2 mules can haul the same load as one boat. Instead of 6 boatmen you now have 6 teamsters. But instead of 25 boats you now have 150 wagons. Peddie states that pack mules can move at a speed of 3-4 mph. I doubt they move that fast pulling a wagon, but due to the excellent road we'll use the higher figure. But Peddie also states that mules require a minimum of 5 hours a day for grazing and they won't graze at night. So 4 mph for 5 hours = 20. It takes 5 days to move the grain by wagon. And now you not only have to hire the same 150 men, but you have to hire them for a longer period and you have to hire 150 wagons versus 25 boats and you have the additional expense of hiring 300 mules and feeding them.

Which method do you think would be cheaper? I'd bet it's also more difficult to organize 150 wagons than it is 25 boats.

However, land transportation is even less competitive than in this example. Jones states that the harness used in ancient times was inefficient because it pressed upon the windpipe of an animal. The harder it pulled the more its wind was choked off (I've read this elsewhere, but can't cite the reference). Therefore, yoked to a wagon provided only a small increase in the load a mule could pull versus carry on its back. Two of my sources put the load a mule (or horse) can carry at 200 lbs. Two mules would equal 400 lbs. But they can transport more by wagon, even if not a lot more. Three hundred liters of grain would equal about 600 lbs. Let's be generous and say two mules can pull 450 liters in a wagon, more than twice what they could carry. The original 90,000 liters to be transported divided by 450 = 200 wagons. Which would require 200 teamsters and 400 mules. This is starting to get expensive.

During the Middle Ages they did have a much improved horse collar, basically the same design as was used until the end of the use of draft animals. But the roads were worse. Jones states that land transportation can cost 30 times or more as much as water transportation. Even if that's off, there can be little doubt that it was much more expensive until modern times.

posted 03-09-2001 11:15 PM               

On to the main subject. I think much of the disagreement lies in our differing definitions of scorched earth and total war. I would define scorched earth as denying the enemy of the resources he needs within your country by destroying them if necessary. It doesn't matter if it's in a small area or the entire countryside--that's only a matter of scale.

Let's say you're a medieval baron who receives word that an enemy army is advancing towards you and will arrive in a few days. For the purposes of this we'll assume you haven't been summoned by your liege lord. It's still a couple months before harvest, so the enemy can't harvest the grain in your fields for food. What do you do?

Typically, much of the crops still remaining from last year will already be safe behind your castle walls. You issue orders that any food & hay remaining outside be brought to your castle and whatever can't be is to be destroyed and you send out your knights and soldiers to enforce these orders. Since medieval society only produced a small surplus and ten months of food (the time since the last harvest) has already been consumed, there really isn't that much to gather in. Your peasants are unlikely to object to the orders since if the enemy takes the food they'll be the ones to go hungry. Of course, some stocks will be overlooked, you may not have enough time to get it all in and the enemy might find some of the secret stores your peasants hid from you to avoid being taxed on them. But you have stripped your lands to the best of your ability prior to the arrival of the enemy.

Now what about the crops in the field? For the most part they will be grains since that was the basis of the medieval diet, even the wealthy eating more bread than meat. Green grain will do the enemy's soldiers very little good. A starving man will eat it, but get very little food value from it and will suffer indigestion in the process (horribly if the grain is too green). His animals can eat it just as they can grass. However, to keep its strength up a knight's destrier requires ripe grain. And it'd be a good idea for the enemy to supply some to his draft animals as well for the same reason.

So do you try to destroy as much of the crops in the field as you can? If you do, the enemy may stay for a few days to get what little he can, then move on hoping for better luck elsewhere. The shorter his stay, the less damage you're left with. Maybe his animals won't eat up all the grass leaving slim pickings for the animals of your people. Maybe you have a simmering feud with the next lord over and you hope the enemy will go there and stay a good, long time. The enemy will probably destroy much of the crops in the field anyway.

On the other hand, your people depend upon those crops for their survival. Peasants who starve to death don't work your fields and don't pay taxes. Maybe your castle is located on a river providing easy navigation for boats. You can always hope that an appeal to your liege lord or directly to the king will bring in enough food to keep your people alive. Maybe you live in an area where it's just too difficult to bring in significant amounts of food so you'll be left pretty much to your own devices.

So what do you do?

I'm sure some lords chose one courses depending upon circumstances and some chose another. My contention is that there were times in the Middle Ages when a scorched earth policy was practiced, to the extent that they were able to do so.

Do you think that Peter the Great woke up one day during Charles XII's invasion with a totally new idea to use against an invader? I feel destroying resources (especially food) to deny them to an enemy has always been used, although not every time; probably not most times. Peter just took an idea that had been around for millennium and applied it more systematically over a larger area. He could do so because he was an absolute monarch in the way no medieval European king ever was. A king 300 years earlier may have wanted to use a true scorched earth policy against an invader, but a number of his lords would have rebelled against destroying the source of their wealth.

And really, even in modern times scorched earth is rarely used. For one thing, it's less effective now than it would have been in the Middle Ages. With the enormous improvment in transportation since the dawn of the industrial age, armies can now supply themselves from the rear. In fact, they have to. They can't satisfy their huge POL (petroleum-oil-lubricants) and ammo requirments from the enemy's country. The transportation needed to bring up the soldiers' rations from the rear can be regarded almost as an afterthought by comparison. Since invading soldiers don't have to forage for their food, it makes no sense for the invaded country to destroy food needed by its citizens. Naturally, there will be times that it makes sense, but most times it won't.

Now for total war. While not every war or campaign involved it as a standard practice, it was an acceptable practice during the Middle Ages to butcher civilians and lay waste to an enemy's countryside (actually, it was acceptable since the beginnings of warfare). The Old Testament more than once speaks of laying waste to an enemy's country and massacring the entire population of a city or of a nation. Earlier, I mentioned William the Conquoror's harrying of the North following Hastings. It was also done at other times. I'm sure the war seemed total enough to the civilians who were massacred in this instances.

Of course the Middle Ages didn't practice your definition of total war. It wasn't because they lacked the concept or the will; they lacked the MEANS to do so. Total war by your lights couldn't be practiced until the rise of the modern, industrial state with the advanced methods of production, transportation and finance necessary to field huge armies and keep them supplied in the field for as long as it took. In fact, what seems to be your definition of total war happened only in World Wars I & II (although the American Civil War came close). WWIII would have been another if nuclear weapons were resorted to. Thank God, it never occured. Despite the many wars big and little in the last century, only two were total. Total war is an anomaly.

My contention is that at times the Middle Ages did the best they could in regards to scorched earth and total war.

Lastly, I think many campaigns during the Middle Ages degenerated to the point that food became the major objective even with good generalship and a strong leader. As one example, Henry V of England stands in the forefront of medieval commanders, yet the English army was in danger of starvation by the time the French caught up and brought them to battle at Agincourt. (Lucky French! It wasn't easy to bring a medieval army to battle that wished to avoid it. I'll bet those French felt so lucky when they knew there was going to be a battle the next day.) The English were trying to get to the coast where ships could bring food to them. It wasn't easy living off the countryside. While a pre-industrial army didn't have the enormous POL and ammunition requirements of a modern army, fodder for its animals was just as heavy a burden to it considering its resources.

posted 03-10-2001 08:00 AM               

Wars were waged differently in the Middle Ages than they are now. There was also a huge difference in economy and the overall system. I will not go into great detail because you've already brought up most isses associated with that.

Truly the most important reason why scorched earth was not a medieval practice was disobedience. In times when food was so precious, few people would have tolerated burning down the crops. Kings usually did not have enough authority to give such orders. It would mean risking a rebellion, possibly making the situtation even a lot worse.

My definition of total war is an armed conflict that demands active commitment of all citizens. It's a product of the modern era and was unknown in the Middle Ages. But let me try to explain how it originated...

During the Middle Ages, wars were very common, but most involved only a small percentage of the population. The majority of people were more concerned about their own survival. Advances in warfare and technology in the late Middle Ages gradually gave rise to professional armies. The bulk of those was now formed by mercenaries rather than citizens. Peasant armies soon became a thing of the past.

The Thirty Years' War is a typical example of a postmedieval conflict. Fighting was left to mercenaries while the citizens tried to ignore the war in any way they could, even though they often became a helpless target of marauding soldiers.

Then came the period of absolutism. For the first time in modern European history stable central governments emerged. Monarchs learned the lesson of the past and decided to raise new conscript armies, which were much more reliable than mercenaries and relatively inexpensive as well.

But perhaps the greatest single step towards the concept of total war was the rise of nationalist ideas in the 19th c. Suddenly, citizens felt united and obliged to defend their country against hostile neighbours - not because the king said so, but to protect the homeland.

When Napoleon set off on the Russian campaign, the Russians saw him as an antichrist. The whole country rallied to expel the French. Unlike in the Middle Ages when every man was pretty much for himself, patriotic feelings (which were almost non-existent in earlier times) prevailed over personal interests. People were willing to burn their homes and belongings and sacrifice everything they had just to get rid of the enemy.

posted 03-10-2001 12:27 PM               

Vietnam, the Boer War, Afganistan and Chechnya were/are all vicious conflicts. But the extent of targeting civilian populations and laying to waste the enemy's country were only practiced to the extent that they had often been in the Middle Ages and earlier. None of them had anything to compare to WWII's mass carpet bombing of cities and the determination to destroy utterly the enemy's infrastructure if that was what it took. So while they could meet my definition of total war, they don't meet yours.

Unless you're claiming the British, the US, the USSR and Russia all mobolized their entire countries and put them on a war footing to wage those wars? In every one of these cases the nations waging the war had sizable forces that never took part in the war. Sounds to me like they were fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Hardly anybody's definition of total war. Total mobolization of a country is part of the definition of total war.